

## Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 IO-14 PA-02 ISO-00 H-02  
SSM-05 PCH-02 INR-10 HA-05 EA-12 PM-05 MCE-00  
ACDA-12 AID-05 EB-08 L-03 OMB-01 SS-15 TRSE-00  
MCT-01 INRE-00 SSO-00 /135 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/P:WBHARRIS:RGH/LW  
APPROVED BY NEA/P:GFSHERMAN  
PA/PRS - MR. CARTER  
H - MR. FLATEN  
SSM - MR. MC ANDREW  
NEA/IAI - MR. SMITH  
NEA/ARN - MR. DRAPER  
NEA/EGY - MR. MARTHINSEN  
NEA/ARP - MR. TWINAM

-----026717 060252Z /70

O 060040Z JUL 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
USMISSION SINAI  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
USINT BAGHDAD  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
USCINCEUR

SECDEF WASHDC 0000  
JCS WASHDC 0000  
CIA WASHDC 0000  
NSC WASHDC 0000  
USICA  
POUCH ALGIERS

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CINCEUR FOR POLAD, TEL AVIV FOR PAO, DELIVER BY 9 A.M.

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING - JULY 5

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING ARE  
EXCERPTS FROM DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING FOR JULY 5, 1978.  
FYI ONLY, SPOKESMAN TODAY WAS HODDING CARTER III.

MR. CARTER: UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL  
AFFAIRS DAVID D. NEWSOM WILL DEPART ON JULY 7TH ON A TRIP  
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TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN ASIA. HE WILL VISIT IRAN,  
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND WILL  
MEET WITH OFFICIALS OF THOSE GOVERNMENTS AND OUR EMBAS-  
SIES IN EACH OF THE CAPITALS.

THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WILL BE TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH  
LEADERS OF THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL  
INTEREST AND CONCERN.

THIS WILL BE THE UNDER SECRETARY'S FIRST VISIT TO THIS  
REGION IN HIS PRESENT POSITION AND WILL GIVE HIM AN  
OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME DIRECTLY ACQUAINTED WITH THE  
VIEWS AND CONCERNS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATES IN  
THE AREA.

Q. WAS THERE THOUGHT GIVEN TO HIM INCLUDING BAGHDAD ON  
THE ITINERARY?

A. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THAT IS ANTICIPATED.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE REPORTS THAT THE  
UNITED STATES HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO LET ISRAEL SELL  
KFIR JETS TO TAIWAN WITH AMERICAN BUILT ENGINES?

A. THE MATTER OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN HAS A  
NUMBER OF ASPECTS, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE TRANSFER  
OF KFIR JET FIGHTER BOMBERS FROM ISRAEL TO TAIWAN, SHOULD

TAIWAN DECIDE TO BUY THEM. AS INDICATED IN SOME PRESS REPORTS, WE DID SAY, AT THE TIME OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO ISRAEL, THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON SUCH A SALE. I HAVE TO SAY TO YOU THAT AS A SPOKESMAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT I AM IN FACT NOT SURE AS TO WHAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAY OR MAY

NOT HAVE IN MIND IN REGARD TO THIS.

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THE ISSUE OF THE KFIR HAS BEEN CONSIDERED ALONG WITH THE POSSIBLE SALE OF F-4 PHANTOM FIGHTERS TO TAIWAN, BUT TO REPEAT SOMETHING THAT I SAID OVER THE WEEK-END, NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS GOVERNMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE F-4 SALE.

Q. AS YOU UNDERSTAND IT, WOULD THE KFIR SALE PRECLUDE THE PHANTOM SALE?

A. MY PROBLEM WITH THAT QUESTION IS THAT I AM NOT AS SURE AS SOME PRESS REPORTS I HAVE SEEN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN IS PREPARED AT THIS POINT TO SAY THEY WANT THE KFIR, AND I CAN'T TALK ABOUT WHAT PRECLUDES SOMETHING BECAUSE THEY HAVE TO MAKE THE PURCHASES.

Q. IS THE U.S. STILL INTERESTED IN SELLING THE PHANTOM?

A. AS I SAID, THE DECISION ON THAT SALE HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN.

Q. TAKEN AT WHAT LEVEL, THE WHITE HOUSE LEVEL?

A. IT HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN AT THE ONLY LEVEL THAT FINALLY MATTERS.

Q. DID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RECOMMEND TO THE TAIWANESE TO GO TO ISRAEL?

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT RECOMMENDED A SET OF SUPPLIERS OR PURCHASERS. THE DECISIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN BY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS TO ITS OWN NEEDS. OUR DECISIONS, IN THE ONE INSTANCE, AS I SAY, HAVE NOT BEEN FINALLY TAKEN  
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WHEN IT COMES TO THE F-4S, AND ON THE OTHER, WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE ISRAELIS THAT WE WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY UPON THE SALE IF SUCH A SALE WERE IN FACT ENTERED INTO CONTRACTUALLY BY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND ISRAEL.

Q. THERE HAVE BEEN THREE OR FOUR TIMES WHEN AMERICAN PERMISSION FOR ISRAEL TO SELL THESE PLANES HAVE BEEN WITHHELD. WHY DID THE UNITED STATES NOW DECIDE TO GIVE ISRAEL PERMISSION TO SELL THESE PLANES, IF TAIWAN WISHES TO BUY THEM?

A. I REALLY DON'T HAVE ANY WORTHWHILE COMMENT TO OFFER ON THAT QUESTION, AND I DON'T THINK I WILL BE ABLE TO GET AN ANSWER FOR YOU. I AM REALLY NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU REASONS.

Q. THIS MESSAGE THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT CARRIED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY ON A SALE OF KFIRS. IS THAT A FINAL DECISION BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT? AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU DON'T DISCUSS SUCH THINGS UNTIL THERE IS A FINAL DECISION, AND WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS THAT BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA HAS EVEN ASKED FOR THESE PLANES, YOU ARE ANNOUNCING THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE ALL RIGHT. DOES THIS AMOUNT TO A DECISION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THAT THE KFIRS COULD BE TRANSFERRED?

A. I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT IF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES CARRIED SUCH A MESSAGE, THAT I HAVE TO

ASSUME THAT THAT IS THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE DECISION IS TAKEN.

Q. SO IT IS IN THIS CASE A FINAL DECISION, EVEN THOUGH THE REQUEST HASN'T BEEN MADE.

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A. I CAN ONLY REPEAT THAT WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT SUCH A SALE WOULD BE ONE UPON WHICH WE WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY.

Q. IS THIS DECISION RELATED TO ISRAELI DESIRES TO SELL THE SAME PLANE TO OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL, OR IS IT JUST LIMITED TO TAIWAN?

A. IT ONLY HAS A SPECIFIC APPLICATION.

Q. TO TAIWAN?

A. YES.

Q. BUT DOES THE U.S. LOOK FAVORABLY UPON ANY OTHER SALES TO ANY OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE ISRAELI FIGHTER, SUCH AS ECUADOR?

A. I THINK THAT OUR POLICY THERE IS UNCHANGED, TO

BE SPECIFIC WITH YOU.

Q. IS IT FAIR TO DRAW AN INFERENCE FROM ALL YOU HAVE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO APPROVE THE SALE TO TAIWAN BECAUSE YOU DON'T REALLY THINK IT IS GOING TO COME OFF ANYHOW?

A. NO. THE ONLY REASON I AM BEING AS CAREFUL AS I AM BEING WITH IT IS THAT I HESITATE TO ANNOUNCE CONTRACTS FOR OTHER GOVERNMENTS. I SIMPLY HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER SUCH A SALE WOULD COME OFF.

Q. IF THE UNITED STATES STILL HAD IN THE BACK OF ITS MIND A DESIRE TO SELL THE PHANTOM TO TAIWAN, THE PERMISSION THAT

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IT GIVES ISRAEL TO SELL THE KFIR TO TAIWAN HAS A SYMBOLIC AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE BUT IT HAS NO ECONOMIC REWARD. SO, IN OTHER WORDS, UNTIL YOU CAN TAKE CARE OF ONE OF THE PROBLEMS, YOU LEAVE LOOSE THE IMPLICATION THAT THIS IS A RATHER MEANINGLESS GESTURE.

A. THE ONLY PROBLEM THAT I HAVE ON THAT IS, AGAIN, I CANNOT SPEAK FOR WHAT TAIWAN WOULD WANT IN THE WAY OF AIRCRAFT. I SIMPLY DON'T KNOW WHAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA WANTS.

Q. WHAT ARE THE DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN ECUADOR AND TAIWAN AS FAR AS AIRPLANE SALES ARE CONCERNED?

A. THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW AND ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEM INTO A REGION APPLIES IN THE CASE OF ECUADOR, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, AND WOULD NOT APPLY HERE.

Q. THE EGYPT PLAN, DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSE TO WHAT HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY THE EGYPTIANS?

A. WE ARE PLEASED THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS. TOGETHER WITH THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT HAS

ALREADY BEEN PUT FORWARD, THIS EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL PROVIDES A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A WEST BANK AND GAZA SETTLEMENT.

AT THE LONDON MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PROPOSED, BOTH PROPOSALS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AND EACH SIDE'S POSITION WOULD BE PROBED.

WE HOPE THAT OUT OF THAT PROCESS MIGHT COME MOMENTUM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

AT THE TIME THAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN PRESENTED HIS PRO-  
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POSALS IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER, WE SAID THAT WE THOUGHT  
THAT THEY PROVIDED A FAIR BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

WE NOW HAVE AN EGYPTIAN PAPER, AND TO REPEAT  
MYSELF, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TWO PROPOSALS TOGETHER COULD  
PROVIDE A BASIS ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS CAN CONTINUE.

Q. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL?

A. AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, AS I HAVE SAID. THEY,  
COMBINED, WITH THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS, PROVIDE THE  
BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WHICH WE THINK IS IMPORTANT AND IT  
IS A BASIS WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN BE ACTIVELY PURSUED IN  
FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. AND  
I THINK THAT I WANT TO REMIND YOU OF THAT CONTEXT OF THE  
TWO.

Q. YOU SEEM TO BE SAYING OR GIVING LESS STRESS THAN THE  
PRESIDENT HAS DONE. I SEEM TO REMEMBER CARTER SAID THAT  
THE ISRAELI PLAN WOULD BE THE BASIS NOT FOR NEGOTIATIONS  
BUT FOR A SETTLEMENT.

A. I AM SORRY, THAT WAS A MISAPPREHENSION. HE DID NOT  
SAY SETTLEMENT. HE SAID FAIR BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. I  
SAW SOME REPORTS THAT CAME OUT OF MEETINGS WHICH SUGGESTED  
THAT. I DO NOT RECALL HIM SAYING THAT PUBLICLY.

Q. WHAT IS THE AMERICAN EFFORT GEARED NOW TO IN LONDON,  
SPECIFICALLY?

A. THE NOTION, OF COURSE ASSUMING THAT A LONDON MEETING  
DOES COME OFF, WHICH WE ARE INTERESTED IN, AS THE PRESI-  
DENT HAS SAID, WOULD BE THAT THESE TWO PLANS  
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TAKEN TOGETHER WOULD IN EFFECT BE A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK  
FOR THE TWO SIDES, THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE

DIFFERENCES, MOVE BETWEEN THE TWO, TAKE COMMON POSITIONS  
THAT ARE IN BOTH, AND MOVE FROM THERE. IT IS, IN EFFECT,  
AN INFORMAL WAY OF SETTING AN AGENDA, BECAUSE WE DO HAVE  
TWO PROPOSALS BEFORE US.

Q. WHAT DO YOU NEED THE LONDON MEETING FOR, THEN?

A. THE LONDON MEETING IS FOR THE SAME REASON THAT WE NEED  
ANY KIND OF DIRECT NEGOTIATION, WHETHER IT IS IN LONDON

OR ANYWHERE ELSE. WE THINK, AS WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID, THAT THE PROPER WAY FOR NEGOTIATION IN THIS IS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, AND SINCE THEY BOTH NOW HAVE PLANS PUT FORWARD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION HAS A BASE UPON WHICH TO PROCEED.

Q. ARE YOU GOING TO TRY TO PRODUCE A THIRD PLAN HERE?

A. NO WE ARE NOT.

Q. WHERE EXACTLY DOES THE LONDON MEETING STAND? DO YOU NOW HAVE A FIRM ACCEPTANCE FROM THE EGYPTIANS BUT AN UNFIRM REPLY FROM THE ISRAELIS, IS THAT RIGHT?

A. WE HAVE IN FACT BEEN TOLD THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD AGREE TO IT. WE FOUND A POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN ISRAEL AT THE TIME OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TALKS THERE. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS SAID THAT A FORMAL RESPONSE WILL BE FORTHCOMING TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S INVITATION AFTER THE CABINET MEETING NEXT SUNDAY.

Q. SO YOU ARE ASSUMING THAT THE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE.

A. WE CERTAINLY HOPE THAT IT WILL.  
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Q. WHAT DATES, EXACTLY?

A. LET ME JUST SAY THAT OBVIOUSLY THE DATES, GIVEN THE SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE, AND GIVEN THE TIME THAT WE HOPE TO GET AN ANSWER FROM MR. BEGIN AND THE CABINET, WOULD BE, SINCE WE GO OFF ON THE 11TH, AND WE HAVE THE BONN STATE VISIT AND THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, THAT IT WOULD COME AFTER THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, WHICH WILL CONCLUDE ON THE 17TH.

Q. SO IT WILL BE WHAT, THE 17TH AND 18TH?

A. I WOULD THINK, IF WE ARE GOING TO DO IT, AND IF WE GET SOME AGREEMENT, THAT IT WOULD COME AFTER THE 17TH.

Q. 18TH AND 19TH?

A. YOU KNOW, WHEN THE CAT IS HALF OUT OF THE BAG, BUT YOU DON'T HAVE IT QUITE TOTALLY UNTIED, YOU HESITATE TO JUST PUT DOWN DATES, BUT I CAN'T STEER YOU FAR AWAY FROM THOSE HOPES.

Q. THE ISRAELIS DESCRIBED THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL AS CALLING ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TO THE 1967 BORDERS, AND THEY SAID THEY WOULD NEVER DO THAT. WHERE DO YOU STAND ON THAT?

A. WE ARE NOT GOING TO TRY TO STAND ON ANY OF THE POSITIONS PER SE. WE BELIEVE THAT THAT IS FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND WE BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION IN THESE TWO PLANS.

Q. IS IT YOUR OPINION THAT THESE TWO PROPOSALS AND UNCLASSIFIED

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PRESUMABLY THE AGREEMENT TO A LONDON MEETING HAVE OBVIATED THE NEED TO ARRIVE AT A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OR DO YOU THINK THAT THAT WILL BE ON THE AGENDA IN LONDON?

A. I WOULD HESITATE TO TRY TO SET THE AGENDA. LET ME SAY AGAIN, HOWEVER, SINCE WE NOW HAVE TWO POSITIONS PUT FORWARD, THAT YOU HAVE THE TOOLS, THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION IN THEM; AND I DON'T HAVE TO TRY TO GUESS AT ANY FURTHER AGENDA TO TELL YOU THAT THAT, IN ITSELF, WILL PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL CHUNK UPON WHICH EVERYONE CAN CHEW WHEN THEY GET TO A MEETING.

Q. ACCORDING TO YOUR READING OF THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS, ARE THERE ANY PRECONDITIONS IN IT, WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE CONVENING OF THE LONDON TALKS?

A. I AM REALLY NOT GOING TO TRY TO CHARACTERIZE THAT. I REALLY THINK THAT WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED AN ANSWER AND I HAVE SAID THAT BOTH OF THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDE A BASIS, TOGETHER, FOR A NEGOTIATION; AND I AM NOT GOING TO TRY TO GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT RIGHT NOW.

Q. THE PRESIDENT TALKS ABOUT THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS AS A FAIR BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. NOW YOU ARE JUST TALKING ABOUT A "BASIS" FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IS THERE ANY MEANING TO THIS? WHY DON'T YOU DESCRIBE THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS AS A FAIR BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS?

A. I WOULDN'T FIND ANY GREAT MEANING IN THIS. WHAT I AM TRYING TO SAY TO YOU NOW IS THAT WE HAVE TWO PLANS WHICH ARE, WE THINK, STRUCTUARALLY A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION AND AT THIS POINT WE ARE INTERESTED IN GETTING THOSE NEGOTIATIONS GOING.

Q. ISN'T IT A FACT THAT WHAT YOU HOPE TO BE NEGOTIATED UNCLASSIFIED

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IS A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD THEN ALLOW FOR THE COMPLETION OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT?



A. LET ME SAY THAT I WOULD, AGAIN, HESITATE TO TRY TO NARROW IT TO A FOCUS LIKE THAT. WE HAVE SOME CONCRETE PROPOSALS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD TO DEAL WITH A SPECIFIC SET OF PROBLEMS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. WE HAVE A CHANCE TO TAKE THOSE TWO, AND WITH THE PARTIES TALKING DIRECTLY TO EACH OTHER, TO TRY TO COME TO SOME KIND OF MOVEMENT.

THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS NOT SOMETHING THAT I AM SAYING IS PUT ASIDE, OR ABANDONED. I'M SIMPLY TELLING YOU THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING HERE WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED PARALLEL. EVENTS HAVE MOVED SINCE THE LAST RANGE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND WE NOW HAVE A DIFFERENT KIND OF SITUATION.

Q. I JUST WANTED TO CONTAIN THE THINGS--IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS YOU AREN'T EXPECTING THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE A SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND THE PALESTINIANS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, ARE YOU?

A. I THINK THAT IF THE TWO WHO HAVE PUT FORWARD IDEAS ON THESE SUBJECTS CAN COME TO SOME AGREED POSITIONS, THEN YOU HAVE THE BASIS FOR MORE NEGOTIATIONS. I CAN'T PUT A CAP ON IT. I CAN'T CHANNEL IT MYSELF. IT REALLY IS UP TO THE TWO PARTIES.

Q. ARE YOU KEEPING THE JORDANIANS INFORMED AS TO THE PROPOSALS IN THERE?

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A. I DON'T KNOW IN WHAT FORM, BUT I WOULD IMAGINE THAT WE HAVE, AS ALWAYS, TAKEN EFFORT TO KEEP THEM INFORMED DIPLOMATICALLY, AND THAT THOSE EFFORTS ARE GOING TO CONTINUE.

Q. WELL SPECIFICALLY, ARE THEY GOING TO SEE THE EGYPTIAN PLAN "FROM THE UNITED STATES"--OR ARE YOU GOING TO LET

THEM SEE IT "FROM CAIRO" OR WHAT?

A. I BELIEVE IT WAS PRETTY FULLY PUBLISHED ALREADY, IN EGYPT, IN TOTO, AS I READ IT THIS MORNING.

Q. PHYSICALLY, HOW DO YOU ENVISION IT? IS IT GOING TO BE A CONTINUATION OF THE JERUSALEM, A LA JANUARY CONFERENCE, OR IS IT GOING TO BE A HOTEL ROOM SHUTTLE, OR WHAT?

A. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE TWO PARTIES IN THE ROOM--A LA, THEREFORE, JERUSALEM.

Q. SO THEN THERE WILL BE A SINGLE TABLE, WITH A SEAT PRESUMABLY FOR THE U.N. AS WELL?

A. I AM NOT AWARE OF THE U.N. PRESENCE, AS A MATTER OF

FACT. I JUST DON'T KNOW THAT THAT HAS ARISEN.

Q. DO YOU EXPECT THE LONDON TALKS TO LEAD TO A DIRECT RESUMPTION OF JERUSALEM? AND IF YOU DO, WHY NOT HAVE THIS COMING MEETING ON OR ABOUT THE 17TH, IN JERUSALEM INSTEAD OF IN LONDON?

A. THE SITE OF LONDON SEEMED TO BE AGREEABLE IN THE ABSTRACT TO ALL THE PARTIES. IT IS AGREEABLE IN THE CONCRETE TO TWO OF THE THREE; AND WE WILL SEE ON UNCLASSIFIED

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SUNDAY, AS I SAY, THE SPECIFIC RESPONSE OF ISRAEL. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TO DO WITHOUT REGARD TO LOCATION, IS TO GET THE TWO PARTIES NEGOTIATING TOGETHER.

Q. IF YOU WANT THE TWO PARTIES TO COME TOGETHER IN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, HOW DO YOU ENVISAGE THE AMERICAN ROLE IN LONDON?

A. I THINK WE CONTINUE TO BE THE FACILITATOR, THE PARTY ATTEMPTING TO HELP THE PARTIES NEGOTIATE IT WHERE NECESSARY, TO TRY TO BE A BRIDGE.

BUT LET ME SAY THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WE ARE SIMPLY THERE AS ONE WHO IS ON GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH SIDES, WHO HOPES TO BE A FACILITATOR, DOES NOT INTEND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE AT ALL TO INTRUDE ITS OWN PLANS, PERCEPTIONS, OR WHAT HAVE YOU.

I WOULD CONTINUE THAT, AS IN THE PAST IT WOULD NOT BE A NEW THING IF THEY CAME TO AN IMPASSE AS THEY DID, FOR

INSTANCE ON THE SETTING OF THE AGENDA IN JERUSALEM, THEN IT MIGHT BE THAT WE COULD HELP THEM FIND A COMMON AVENUE TO GETTING OVER IT. I DO NOT WANT THIS THING TO BE CONSIDERED AS OUR HAVING A PLAN THAT WE ARE READY TO TRUMP ON THE TABLE. NOTHING OF THE SORT.

BUT OUR FIRST AND PRIMARY INTEREST IS IN HAVING THE TWO PARTIES NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY. THE ROLE WE WOULD PLAY, AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE ONE WE PLAYED AT JERUSALEM.

Q. DO YOU SEE THE LONDON MEETING AS AIMED AT TRYING TO UNCLASSIFIED

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NARROW THE SUBSTANTIVE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, OR MORE AT TRYING TO GET A RESUMPTION OF THE MORE PROCEDURALLY-- TO TRY TO GET A RESUMPTION OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IN JERUSALEM?

A. I DO NOT WANT TO TRY TO SPELL OUT MUCH BEYOND WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID--THAT WE HOPE THAT IN A LONDON MEETING, BOTH POSITIONS HAVE BEEN PUT ON THE TABLE COULD BE DISCUSSED, AND THE POSITIONS OF BOTH COULD BE PROBED IN DIRECT TALKS. THAT OUT OF THE PROCESS IN LONDON WOULD COME THE FAMOUS WORD "RENEWED MOMENTUM" IN THE OVERALL NEGOTIATIONS THAT WE HOPE WOULD LEAD TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q. KURT WALDHEIM HAS SAID IN GENEVA TO THE U.N. CORRESPONDENTS, THAT HE WAS "SKEPTICAL" ABOUT ANY OTHER APPROACH EXCEPT GENEVA, TO GET SOME ACCORD OF SOME KIND BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR A SETTLEMENT. AND HE CALLED FOR A PREPARATORY CONFERENCE OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO RESUME THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT IT?

A. I HADN'T SEEN THAT; BUT I THINK THAT WHAT OUR INTEREST IS, I HAVE JUST SPELLED OUT HERE; AND I DON'T REALLY HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT REPORT WHICH I HAVEN'T SEEN.

Q. THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEFENSE MINISTER'S MEETING, AS WELL AS THE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

A. I HAVE COMMENTED ON THAT BEFORE BY SAYING THAT WE DO NOT KNOW DIRECTLY OF SUCH A MEETING AND THAT THE ONLY WORDS I HAVE HEARD ON THAT, HAVE COME IN LEAKS OR BACK-FOUNDERS, OR SOMETHING OUT OF ONE CAPITAL OR THE OTHER-- AND THAT YOU MIGHT PUT IT TO THEM. I SIMPLY DON'T KNOW.

Q. HAVE YOU GOT ANYTHING ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON?  
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A. OUR VIEW OF THE EVENTS IN LEBANON ARE ENCAPSULATED IN THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT WAS RELEASED TWO DAYS AGO. MY INFORMATION ON WHAT IS GOING ON IN LEBANON IS, IN FACT, LITTLE BETTER THAN WHAT YOU SEE ON THE WIRES. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING NEW TO OFFER OF ANY SPECIFIC SORT.

3. FOLLOWING IS A QUESTION TAKEN AT THE NOON PRESS BRIEFING, JUNE 30, AND POSTED JULY 3, 1978.

Q. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS IN THE PLO THAT DO NOT ENGAGE IN OR ADVOCATE TERRORISM?

A. -- THERE ARE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PLO THAT HAVE NO INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY OR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PALESTINIAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY, THE CENTER FOR PALESTINE STUDIES AND THE GENERAL UNION OF PALESTINIAN STUDENTS.

-- THERE ARE ALSO INDIVIDUALS IN THE PLO, WHO ARE NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY GROUPING AND WHO NEITHER PARTICIPATE IN NOR ADVOCATE THE USE OF TERRORISM.  
VANCE

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED AMEMBASSY ALGIERS.

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**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING - JULY 5  
**TAGS:** SOPN, XF  
**To:** AMMAN BEIRUT MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/036e566b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
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